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SYMPOSIUM 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN SUBURBIA: 
THE IMPORTANCE BUT LIMITED POWER 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
STATE OVERRIDE TOOL 
SAM STONEFIELD* 
"An Act providing for the construction of low and moderate in-
come housing in cities and towns and providing for relief from 
local restrictions hampering such construction." 
Title of chapter 777 of the Acts and Resolves of 1969 
"Developing communities must make realistically possible the 
opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for 
all categories of people who may wish to live there." 
Justice Frederick Hall, Southern Burlington County 
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 
336 A.2d 713 (1975) ("Mt. Laurel/,,). 
I. THE CONFERENCE AND ITs PAPERS: PURPOSES AND CONTEXT 
On December 10, 1999, the Western New England College 
School of Law hosted a conference on "Increasing Affordable 
Housing and Mobility in Three New England States and New 
Jersey: Comparative Perspectives on the Occasion of the Thirtieth 
Anniversary of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law." 
The conference had two goals. First, in commemoration of the 30th 
anniversary of the 1969 enactment of the Massachusetts Compre-
hensive Permit Act ("chapter 40B"), the Law School desired to rec-
ognize and to honor some of the many people and organizations 
that contributed to the statute's initial passage, survival, and imple-
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B., 1967, 
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1971, Harvard University; Commissioner, Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, 1977-1981. 
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mentation over the ensuing decades.1 Notwithstanding the short-
comings mentioned at the conference, examined in the conference 
papers, and addressed further in other venues,2 the Massachusetts 
statute remains a remarkable achievement, and its creators and sup-
porters deserve our admiration and congratulations. Second, the 
conference was designed to facilitate the first-ever exchange of in-
formation about the 4 extraordinary statutes enacted in Massachu-
. setts in 1969, New Jersey in 1986,3 Connecticut in 1989,4 and Rhode 
1. The awardees are described in "Honorees." See 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. app. 
B (forthcoming 2001). A schedule of the Conference is also provided in Appendix B. 
See id. 
2. There are at least two examples of valuable post-conference discussions of the 
Massachusetts statute. The Citizens Housing and Planning Association ("CHAPA") 
presented its own very successful commemorative program on the anniversary of chap-
ter 40B on October 15, 1999 that included a report on the statute's implementation. 
More importantly, CHAPA has organized a working group that is preparing a report on 
how to improve the operation and effectiveness of the Massachusetts statute. See http:// 
www.chapa.org (providing further information about the organization and this 
initiative ). 
Additionally, the Massachusetts Housing Partnership Fund sponsored a study, con-
ference, and follow-up workshops on inclusionary zoning ordinances - local initiatives 
that can often complement chapter 40B efforts - in Massachusetts cities and towns. 
Both the report and other information about the conference are available on the MHP 
web site, http://www.mhpfund.comlfund/zoning. 
The continued deliberations of the Connecticut Blue Ribbon Commission led to a 
very informative report whose recommendations were largely adopted by the Connecti-
cut legislature in the 2000 amendments to the Connecticut Affordable Housing Act. 
See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N, STATE OF CONN., HOUSING REPORT (1989). State Repre-
sentative Patrick Flaherty, co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Commission, deserves special 
recognition for his intelligent and skillful leadership in this area. 
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 1986). Unlike the statutes of the 
other three jurisdictions, the New Jersey statute has a constitutional mandate. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court found that the "general welfare" clause of the New Jersey state 
constitution imposed on every town an obligation to meet its fair share of the regional 
housing need. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 
A.2d 713, 727-28 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. The court later created a set 
of special procedures and rules for implementing this constitutional principle. See S. 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 423-35 (N.J. 
1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]. After the legislature rejected Mount Laurel II by 
passing a statute, the Housing Opportunity Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
the Act as a constitutionally-adequate mechanism for enforcing the Mount Laurel I 
constitutional right. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 642-43 
(N.J. 1986). 
The history and politics of the Mount Laurel litigation and legislation are engag-
ingly described in two recent books. See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: 
RACE, SPACE, AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996); DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR ToWN: RACE, 
HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995); see also Bonnie L. Koneski-White, In-
creasing Affordable Housing and Regional Housing Opportunity in New England, 22 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (providing the citations to the voluminous liter-
ature on the Mount Laurel doctrine). 
4. Municipal Housing Finance Assistance Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-300 to 315 
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Island in 1991.5 Given the participants' combined decades of expe-
rience, there was a sense that public officials, housing developers, 
housing advocates, practicing lawyers, and academics would benefit 
from a comparative assessment of these laws, their administration 
and interpretation, as well as an examination of the success and fail-
ures of implementation in the four states. The conference more 
than met its goals. The attendance, interaction, and discussion at 
the conference exceeded all expectations, and the papers that fol-
low significantly advance the understanding of the use of this statu-
tory tool to stimulate the production of suburban affordable 
housing and to encourage city-to-suburb mobility. I am grateful to 
the panelists, attendees, Dean Donald Dunn, Professor Eric 
Gouvin, and many others for their assistance in making the confer-
ence possible, and to the Law Review for making the papers acces-
sible to a broader audience. 
This article offers a brief comparative overview and critique of 
the four statutes explored at the conference; the other papers will 
analyze them in greater depth. At the broadest level, these statutes 
address such major themes as urban decline and suburban growth, 
racial and economic segregation, and localism versus regionalism. 
The four state statutes are intertwined with these themes and with 
other statutes and programs that have helped to shape post-World 
War II development of America's cities and suburbs. Thus, it is not 
possible to understand fully or to commemorate properly the 30th 
anniversary of Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit statute with-
out also recognizing the 50th anniversary of the federal Housing 
Act of 1949, the landmark federal law that established a "decent 
home and a suitable living environment for every American family"· 
as a national goal.6 The programs and policies developed under the 
(1989); see Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten 
Years of Hope, Why Only Middling Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2001) (discussing the origins, interpretation, and evolution of the Connecticut statute). 
5. Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, ch. 91-154, 1991 R.I. 
Pub. Laws 1 (codified at R.1. GEN. LAWS §§ 45 to 53-1.(1991)). As Judge Stephen Er-
ickson informed us at the conference, the Rhode Island statute was closely patterned on 
the Massachusetts statute, with 2 notable exceptions. First, the composition of the ad-
ministrative body that enforces the statute differs (the Rhode Island agency has 9 mem-
bers, including a district court judge, with appointments made variously by the Chief of 
the district court, Majority leader of the Senate, and Speaker of the House, and the 
Governor.) See R.1. GEN. LAWS §§ 45 to 53-7 (1998). Second, the definition of region 
which, under the Rhode Island statute, means the entire state is different. 
6. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.c. §§ 1441-90 (1994) (presenting this famous 
statement of the national policy in § 1441 of the statute). The 1949 Housing Act is most 
notable for its authorization of a federally-funded, locally-administered urban renewal 
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Housing Act and other statutes (such as the federal highway pro-
gram) helped guide post-World War II America onto the path of 
suburban expansion that began in the early 1950s and continues to 
this day? Occurring when the dominant Euclidean zoning para-
digm enshrined local control of most land use decisions,s and 
when racial discrimination was both legal and widespread,9 this ex-
plosion of suburban growth created a geography of inequality that 
led the Kerner Commission in 1968 to state that we are "moving 
towards two societies, one black and one white - separate and un-
program in Title I and public housing program in Title III. It and its companion legisla-
tion also extended and broadened the lending and insurance authority of the Federal 
Housing Administration that had been first created pursuant to the Housing Act of 
193'4. See id. at 1907-08; 1558-59. There is also an extremely useful and informative 
symposium published by the Housing Policy Debate Journal in volume 11 that describes 
the political history and implementation of the 1949 Housing Act from a variety of 
perspectives. 11 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 291-520 (2000). 
7. See Robert Fishman, The American Metropolis at Century's End: Past and Fu-
ture Influences, 11 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 199, 200 (2000) (citing a recent survey of 
250 planners, architects, and urban historians which found that the top 10 influences on 
the growth of the American Metropolis during the past 50 years were: the 1956 Inter-
state Highway Act and dominance of the automobile, FHA mortgage financing and 
sub4ivision regulation, deindustrialization of central cities, urban renewal, Levittown 
and mass-produced suburban tract housing, racial segregation and job discrimination in 
citfes and suburbs, enclosed shopping malls, Sunbelt-type sprawl, air conditioning, and 
the urban riots of the 1960's); see also JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW 
FRONTIER (1992) (discussing the development of the American suburb); KENNETH T. 
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1985). Compare ROSALYN BAXANDALL & ELIZABETH EWEN, PICTURE WINDOWS: 
How THE SUBURBS HAPPENED (2000) (providing a contrasting view of surburban de-
velopment and life), with ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF 
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000) (criticizing suburbia 
from the "new urbanism" perspective). 
8. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a local zoning 
ordinance from constitutional attack and establishing the pattern of deferential review 
of zoning laws and decisions that predominates American land use law); see also Flo-
rence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21" 
Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (discussing the origins of zoning 
laws and how the historical context of the Euclid case performs a valuable service in 
connecting the emergence of modern zoning with the then-prevailing discriminatory 
practices and attitudes). 
9. Brown v. Board of Education was not decided until 1954. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
The federal Fair Housing Act, prohibiting housing discrimination as a matter of federal 
law, was not enacted until 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1994». Although racial zoning was held unconstitutional in 
1917, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), and racially restrictive covenants 
were overturned, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948), the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration and the Veterans Administration permitted (and in some cases required) 
racial discrimination in the subdivisions whose mortgages they insured, and for years 
refused to lend to properties occupied by African-Americans. See generally CHARLES 
ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS (1955); Fishman, supra note 7, at 200-17. 
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equal."l0 The statutes discussed at the conference were in response 
to that inequality and its economic and racial segregation, and re-
present an attempt to create, instead, "a geography of 
opportuni ty. "11 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island 
(and, to date, only these four states)12 have enacted and imple-
10. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) 
[hereinafter KERNER COMM'N REPORT]' The report also noted that the continuation of 
present policies would "make permanent the division of our country into two societies; 
one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities: the other, predominately 
white and affluent, located in the suburbs." Id. at 10. 
11. James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding 
Residential Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 
231,231 (1995). The program Rosenbaum discusses was a voucher program, not a zon-
ing and production program, but the goal of creating the "geography of opportunity" is 
the same. . 
12. While several other jurisdictions - notably California, Oregon, Florida, and 
Montgomery County, Maryland - have encouraged suburban affordable housing 
through legislation, they have used techniques other than state override statutes. Cali-
fornia cities and towns primarily use inclusionary zoning ordinances. See Nico Calavita, 
et ai., Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 
HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 109, 117-18 (1997). Dating back to the 1970s, inclusionary 
zoning ordinances were created both as part of air pollution control programs en-
couraged by the federal Environmental Protection Agency and in response to skyrock-
eting housing prices. As of 1994, 64 jurisdictions in California had inclusionary housing 
ordinances, which are said to be responsible for the production of 22,572 affordable 
housing units (with an additional 2439 more in the pipeline), mostly aimed at single 
family buyers with low- (between 50% and 80% of median income) and moderate-
incomes (between 80% and 120% of median income). Id. at 123; see also Nico Calavita 
& Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California: The Experience of Two De-
cades, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N. 150, 158 (1998). While there is a California override 
statute, CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 65580-65589.8 (1997), there are no reported cases involv-
ing any override, no state regulations establishing any override procedures, and no dis-
cussion of the override's use in the extensive literature on California affordable 
housing. Thus, this Author concludes that the California override statute is not used. 
The override provision is part of a comprehensive statute that requires each town to 
have a "housing element" in its municipal plan and further requires the housing ele-
ment to address housing needs of the town and region. See id. § 65302. 
Other states have enacted broad planning statutes that identify (though do not 
fund or require) the construction of suburban affordable housing as a way of meeting 
regional housing need. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161-3215 (West 2000); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 197 (1991); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 36-70-1 to 70-5 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-8-30 to 8-46 (1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, §§ 4312-49 (West 1996). See 
generally Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each 
Other - and Often Agree, 8 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 11 (1997) for a further analysis of 
the Oregon statute and Charles E. Connerly & Marc Smith, Developing a Fair Share 
Housing Policy for Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 63 (1996) for a further analysis 
of the Florida statute. At the county level, Montgomery County, Maryland has had a 
county-wide inclusionary zoning requirement since 1975 that requires developers to 
make 15% of the units in all new developments affordable and to offer 113 of those 
affordable units to the regional housing authority (the Montgomery County Housing 
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men ted statutes that authorize a state administrative agency or 
court to override, under certain conditions, local zoning decisions 
that disallow proposed new construction of suburban affordable 
housing. The statutes are extraordinary both politically and doctri-
nally. Given that population and political power shift to the sub-
urbs and the widespread perception that most suburban voters 
oppose affordable housing in their communities (a perception often 
referred to as the "NIMBY" phenomenon13), it is politically ex-
traordinary that supporters garnered a legislative majority in even 
four state legislatures to authorize the state override of local zoning 
decisions. The statutes are also extraordinary doctrinally in their 
rejection of the Euclidean paradigm that dominates American land 
use law. Replacing the traditional deference to local interests with 
two well-established legal techniques-balancing and burden-shift-
ing-to eliminate "unreasonable" local barriers, the statutes re-
quire that local interests be balanced against state-defined regional 
need and place the burden of persuasion on the locality to justify a 
decision that excludes affordable housing. 
The description and analysis of these statutes in the next three 
sections elaborates a bottom-line assessment: these statutes are an 
important, but also a very limited, tool. There is no question that 
Opportunity Commission). See DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING 
STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 280-99 (1999); see also MICHAEL N. DAN-
IELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 111-12 (1976) (discussing Montgomery and 
Fairfax counties); HERBERT M. FRANKLIN ET AL., INZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-
MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 131 (1974) (discussing Montgomery 
County, Fairfax County, and Los Angeles, CA). The Montgomery County program has 
been the most successful in the nation, both in numbers of units produced and the 
geographical distribution and economic and racial integration of the units, and offers a 
very attractive model for other jurisdictions. See RUSK, supra, at 280-89. On the judi-
cial side, the state supreme courts in New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania 
have ruled that the application of restrictive zoning ordinances in certain situations vio-
late the state constitution. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991); Beren-
son v. New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975); Surrick v Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper 
Providence, 382 A.2d 105, 111-12 (Pa. 1977); Township of Willis town v. Chesterdale 
Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975); In re Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. 1970); 
Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 613 (Pa. 1966). However, these decisions 
are all narrower and more fact-specific than the bold New Jersey decisions in Mount 
Laurel I and Mount Laurel 1/, and there are no reports of any systematic activity to 
implement them. See supra note 3 for a discussion of these two cases. See also Part IV 
infra, where this Author recommends that researchers undertake a comparative study 
of the number and type of housing units built in the 4 override states, compared with 
those built in non-override states induding New York and Pennsylvania. 
13. ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 
NOT IN My BACKYARD: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991) 
[hereinafter KEMP COMM'N REpORTj. A more recently coined term is BANANA, Build 
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything. See http://www.acronymfinder.com. 
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these laws have expanded the "geography of affordable housing,"14 
helping to produce such housing in places where it otherwise would 
not have been built: 18,000 units in Massachusetts;15 1600 in Con-
necticut;16 and 15,000-20,000 in New Jersey17. However, only a 
small percentage of the housing units built in the suburbs in the past 
decades has been affordable, and there is still an urgent need for 
such housing. Further, although the occupancy data is very incom-
plete,18 it seems the statutes have fostered little movement from 
city to suburb by lower-income families and less racial integration. 
The patterns of racial and economic segregation noted by the Ker-
ner Commission have persisted over the past 30 years, further em-
bedding what two social scientists have called an "American 
Apartheid."19 The partial accomplishments of the statutes only un-
derscore the hard work still required to create the desired "geogra-
phy of opportunity." At this point, the statutes merit only a 
conditional two cheers.20 
Given the importance of the statutory goals and the difficulty 
14. Associate Professor Krefetz coined this very apt expression. See Sharon Perl-
man Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and 
Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Legislative Effort To Over-
come Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
15. See Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 18-20) (citing Massachusetts 
figures). 
16. Tondro, supra, note 4 (citing Connecticut figures). 
17. John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount 
Laurel Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (citing New Jersey 
figures). 
18. The lack of accessible and reliable data is a serious problem in monitoring the 
implementation and evaluation of these statutes. It is a serious problem even with re-
spect to units proposed and built; it is a major and fundamental problem with respect to 
the characteristics of the occupants of these units. There is some reliable occupancy 
data but only from New Jersey. See Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Im-
pact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and 
Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1268, 1286-88 (1997). However, that data is both 
incomplete and now dated. 
19. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Their Table 8.1 showing hous-
ing patterns in 30 metropolitan areas from 1970-1990 presents a clear picture of 
increasing segregation. Id. at 222. More recent data suggests that there has been im-
provement in southern and southwestern cities. Racial segregation is much less severe 
in metropolitan areas where the major city has elastic boundaries, like Albuquerque 
and San Antonio. PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, 
AND THE AMERICAN CiTY 84 (1997). 
20. As discussed in Part II, the statutes have both a production goal and a mobil-
ity goal. The two cheers are conditional on improved performance in serving the mobil-
ity goal by reaching out more effectively to low-income urban families who might be 
interested in moving into affordable suburban housing. To the extent that the statutes 
serve only the production goal {producing suburban affordable housing, but housing 
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of achieving them, it is essential that the statutes operate as effec-
tively as possible under ever-changing social, economic, and politi-
cal conditions. The suggestions and criticisms from the conference 
and in these papers will improve the effectiveness of the statutes' 
administration and interpretation. However, it is also necessary to 
recognize their inherent limitations, which flow directly from three 
major conceptual flaws and several related operational weak-
nesses.21 The fundamental flaw is that the statutes established only 
a private right, not a public obligation. Framing the legal issue 
solely as a private right has ignored the important public interests at 
stake and has unduly narrowed legal and policy discussions, as well 
as program development. Instead of imposing a duty and responsi-
bility on state government and local towns to increase the supply of 
suburban affordable housing, the statutes have permitted these en-
tities to meet their statutory obligation simply by reacting to partic-
ular development proposals. The second conceptual flaw has been 
the decision to ignore race in program design, data collection, and 
program evaluation.22 Racial discrimination in housing, housing fi-
nance, employment, and education is responsible for the severe ra-
cial segregation that plagues our metropolitan areas. Remediation 
of that discrimination and its effects was a major reason for the en-
actment of the statutes. Yet, implementation of the statutes has 
been indifferent to racial consequences, as expressed in the ap-
proval of residence preferences and in the absence of outreach and 
support efforts for minority families. The final conceptual flaw is 
that, by addressing only zoning, the statutes are partial and woefully 
incomplete. Exclusionary suburban zoning is only one of the many 
factors and forces that has caused residential segregation, and any 
program seeking to reduce such segregation must encompass more 
than zoning. 
Several operational weaknesses flow from these conceptual 
flaws. Since the statutes address only zoning and only in the con-
that is occupied by moderate-income suburban residents) they may deserve only one 
cheer. See Roisman, supra note 8. 
21. These critical observations are not original. Indeed, one or more of them 
have been made by most of the conference participants and by most commentators 
cited in the Symposium's extensive and valuable bibliography. See Koneski-White, 
supra note 3. 
22. Unlike the flaw concerning private rights versus public obligations and many 
of the operational weaknesses, the flaw of ignoring race in program design and evalua-
tion is not inherent in the statutes and can be remedied without amending the laws. 
While the statutes use race-neutral terms, their text, history, and structure support and 
permit race-conscious efforts. 
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text of a specific development proposed by a specific builder on a 
specific site, they do not require the states to establish policies, pro-
grams, or funding to increase suburban affordable housing. They 
provide neither incentives for, nor sanctions against, the towns. 
Moreover, they offer no funding to builders, nor do they supply 
information or support to low-income and minority urban families 
who might seek to move to the suburbs. These weaknesses limit the 
effectiveness of the statutes. 
Part II of this essay describes the goals of these four statutes, 
their many similarities, and several differences. Part III addresses 
their weaknesses and discusses stronger, more effective tools that 
the states have not adopted. It also suggests that the states selected 
the less effective tool because underlying support for the statutory 
goals is weak and divided, and the opposition to more robust tools 
is strong. Part IV concludes by making a series of recommenda-
tions for improved understanding and effectiveness. Reviewing 
both successful programs and recommendations made as long ago 
as the 1968 Kerner Commission report and as recently as this con-
ference, it suggests that legislatures transform the suburban afford-
able housing issue from a private right to a local obligation and 
state requirement. It also urges legislatures to provide the funding 
necessary to reward towns for meeting this obligation, to assist 
builders in the construction of such housing, and to attract and sup-
port the many minority urban families who wish to live in such 
housing. 
II. DESCRIBING THE STATE OVERRIDE TOOL: GOALS, 
SIMILARITIES, AND DIFFERENCES 
This section identifies the goals of these four statutes, high-
lights the main technique that they created to achieve these goals, 
and then discusses several similarities and differences. Each statute 
has two main goals: production and mobilityP The production 
23. These two goals are not necessarily congruent or equally supported. Part III 
discusses the tension between these goals and the different types of supporters of, and 
the varying levels of support for, each goal. 
Professor Roisman and other commentators have identified racial integration as a 
third goal. Roisman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 16) (citing Naomi Bailin Wish & Ste-
phen Eisdorfer, The Impact of the Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Charac-
teristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1276 (1997)). As a 
matter of statutory construction (although not as a matter of public policy), the better 
view is that integration is one of the reasons that supports the production and mobility 
goals, as opposed to a statutory goal in and of itself. Although racial riots specifically, 
and the civil rights movement generally, played a major role in the enactment of the 
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goal is to increase the production, and thereby the supply of afford-
able housing in suburban communities. The mobility goal, which 
sets the locational parameter and rationale for the production goal, 
is to provide opportunities for mobility that would permit inter-
ested low-income, especially minority low-income, families to move 
from urban to suburban areas.24 Prior to enacting the statutes, the 
legislatures had observed two related problems: (1) the lack of, and 
resistance to, affordable housing in many suburban communities; 
and (2) the concentration of existing affordable housing and low-
income persons in cities. They were also aware of the desire of 
many low-income urban families to take advantage of the educa-
tional and increased employment opportunities in the growing 
suburbs. Along with many presidential commissions and other 
commentators, the legislatures identified suburban resistance and 
exclusionary suburban zoning laws as causes of these problems.25 
Massachusetts statute, and although the plaintiffs in Mount Laurel I explicitly framed 
part of their case in racial terms, all 4 statutes (and the New Jersey judicial opinions and 
subsequent administrative regulations) express their requirements in economic, not ra-
cial terms. See id. (manuscript at 16-21). 
24. While the text of the override statutes authorizes the override of local zoning 
decisions of every type of community - suburban, rural, and urban-my colleague, 
Professor Eric Gouvin, is correct that, the policy reasons apply only to suburban areas 
and not to rural towns or cities. Eric J. Gouvin, Rural Low-Income Housing and Mas-
sachusetts Chapter 40B: A Perspective from the Zoning Board of Appeals, 23 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). Whatever the strength of the argument for produc-
tion of new affordable housing in rural areas (and Professor Gouvin argues forcefully 
that rural affordable housing needs are distinct and probably not best served by new 
construction) new rural housing does not serve the mobility goal. However, the rural 
problem is a minor one. In 1990, 90% of the population of New Jersey, 80% of Con-
necticut, 84% of Massachusetts, and 86% of Rhode Island, lived in urbanized, as op-
posed to rural, areas. See U.S. Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2001). 
While Professor Gouvin is correct on his main point, his other arguments and ob-
servations concerning the override statutes miss the mark. See Gouvin, supra. He goes 
seriously astray by failing to recognize or to accept these statutes as a purposeful shift of 
power from local to state government, and the consequent reallocation of roles in order 
to achieve a public purpose that the legislature determined was thwarted by the preex-
isting allocation of power to localities. With this shift of power as the premise, the 
several issues with which he quarrels (such as the presumption, the shift in the burden 
of proof, the de novo review) follow as sensible and straightforward measures to imple-
ment the new regime. To take but one example, Professor Gouvin laments that there is 
no role for the local ZBA in deciding regional housing need. See id. (manuscript at 41-
50). However, from a policy perspective, in terms of efficiency, consistency, compara-
tive competence and avoidance of bias and error, the legislature correctly assigned that 
task to a state entity; it makes no sense to have each suburb separately defining regional 
housing need. The role of the local ZBA is instead to find and evaluate, subject to de 
novo review, the interests and concerns that cut against (as well as support) the pro-
posed housing. 
25. The 3 national commissions issuing reports in the late 1960s all made similar 
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They enacted these statutes in response, aiming to remove the zon-
ing barrier and thereby help in achieving the goals of increased 
suburban affordable housing and opportunities for city-to-suburb 
mobility. 
Each state adopted a similar technique to achieve the two 
goals: a statutory procedure for the state override of local zoning 
decisions, the "state override too1."26 The statutes authorize a state 
administrative agency or court to override, under certain condi-
tions, a local zoning decision that has disallowed proposed new con-
struction of affordable housing. The statutes implement the state 
override by creating a "builder's remedy," which a builder can in-
voke if denied permission to build affordable housing in a locality 
that has not met its regional housing need. If the town denies zon-
ing for the affordable housing and the builder invokes the statutory 
remedy, the town has the burden of persuasion to prove that its 
denial was based on local interests and concerns that outweigh the 
regional need for additional affordable housing. The town must 
also prove its case by convincing a state administrative agency or 
court rather than a local board. The state override tool reallocates 
power in this specific area from the local to the state government 
and creates a presumption that there is a substantial need for new 
affordable housing in all suburbs that have not met a specific nu-
merical standard. 
The override tool was designed to increase housing production 
and thus is properly classified as a supply-side, rather than a de-
mand-side, tool.27 However, unlike the better-known and more 
widely-used supply-side tools like capital grants, operating subsidies 
and tax credits, the override tool provides no funds directly. Build-
observations and recommendations. See KERNER COMM'N REpORT, supra note 10; 
NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING lliE AMERICAN CITY (1969) [herein-
after DOUGLAS COMM'N REpORT]; THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN Hous.: A DE-
CENT HOME 49-53 (1969) [hereinafter KAISER COMM. REpORT]. 
26. The reallocation of power from local to state government is the most funda-
mental and significant part of the statutes. See Gouvin, supra note 24. To make the 
appeal process more efficient and to provide "one stop shopping," the Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island statutes also reallocate power at the local level and give local Zoning 
Boards of Appeal authority over matters that might otherwise fall within the jurisdic-
tion of another local board, like the Traffic Commission or the Building Department. 
27. "Supply-side subsidies seek to encourage production of more housing units by 
providing incentives to developers and lenders. Demand-side subsidies are designed to 
enable recipients to compete more effectively in the marketplace for existing housing 
units." Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal 
Be Met?, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 365 n.31 (John Charles Boger & 
Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996). See generally HENRY J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSI-
DIES: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES (1972). 
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ers have used the tool to produce affordable housing in two distinct 
ways. The first method, "zoning plus funding," was the dominant 
and expected method at the time the Massachusetts statute was en-
acted and is feasible whenever adequate funding is available.28 
Under this method, builders combine the override zoning with 
funding (capital grants, low-interest loans, tax credits, and operat-
ing subsidies) provided by the federal or state government. The 
1968 Kerner Commission called for the production of 6 million 
units of new affordable housing within 5 years, with the "main 
thrust . . . in the non-ghetto areas, particularly those outside the 
central city."29 Its recommendation that the units be located 
outside the central city was based both on a desire for integration 
and a recognition that future jobs were being created primarily in 
the suburbs.3D 
The housing produced under the "zoning plus funding" 
method is tied directly to the type of housing production programs 
funded by the state and federal government31 and has been prima-
rily multi-family housing (both family and elderly).32 While income 
data is not available, the occupants of the units produced by the 
"zoning plus funding" method are distributed across the range of 
the low- to moderate-income eligible population.33 
More often than not over the past 30 years, funding for new 
affordable housing has not been available, and the "zoning plus 
28. The Massachusetts statute was enacted at a time of great interest in housing 
as several Great Society housing programs were being created at the federal level. See 
ROBERT TAGGART III, Low-INCOME HOUSING: A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL AID 15-20 
(1970). The legislature had also just established the Massachusetts Housing Finance 
Agency. Act of Sept. 8, 1966, ch. 708, 1966 Mass. Acts 711, reprinted in MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 23A app. at § 1-3 (West 1994). 
29. See KERNER COMM'N REpORT, supra note 10, at 260-63. 
30. Id.at217. 
31. If those programs fund elderly housing, then the suburban affordable housing 
will tend to be elderly housing. If those programs fund mixed-income family apart-
ments, then the suburban affordable housing will tend to be mixed-income family apart-
ments. If those programs fund both elderly and family housing, then experience shows 
that the town will prefer the elderly housing, unless the state or federal government 
requires that family housing be built first or simultaneously as a condition of receiving 
support for the elderly housing. 
32. In the mid-1980s, some developers produced affordable suburban condomin-
ium units in Massachusetts as part of that state's Housing Opportunity Program 
("HOP"). As discussed in Dean Krefetz's paper, the use of the state override tool with 
the HOP was controversial. Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 35). 
33. The author bases this assertion on his experience as an MHFA Board mem-
ber, on discussions with federal and state housing officials over the years and on discus-
sion with the presenters at this conference. There is no reliable occupancy data on the 
Massachusetts or Rhode Island housing units built pursuant to the override statutes. 
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funding" method has not been possible. When government funding 
has been lacking, builders have used a "zoning only" approach, 
achieving housing affordability indirectly through a "density bo-
nus"34 generated from the higher-density use permitted by the 
override tool. The builder uses some of the increased income from 
the density bonus to subsidize the below-market-rate affordable 
units. This second method is, and has always been, the dominant 
model in New Jersey35 and Connecticut,36 and as housing funds dis-
appear, it is increasingly the primary method used in all states. As 
Professor Tondro discusses, the "zoning only" method is market-
oriented, an attempt to use the very market forces that built subur-
bia to achieve the statute's production and mobility goals.37 Rely-
ing on the private sector's profit motive instead of government 
funding to define the program, the "zoning only" approach tends to 
produce single-family (detached, semi-detached, and condomin-
ium) housing that is affordable only to families at the upper end 
(that is, the "moderate" end of "low- and moderate-income") of the 
eligible population.38 Thus, while the two approaches both produce 
affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families, they 
tend to produce different products that are used by different seg-
ments of the eligible population. 
These are the broad similarities. The next several paragraphs 
highlight some of the main differences in the operational details of 
the override process in the four jurisdictions. Each state statute es-
tablishes preconditions for its use, including requirements for the 
type of builder, the nature of affordability, the permitted (and im-
permissible) local interests, the definition of regional housing need, 
34. See, e.g., HERBERT M. FRANKLIN ET AL., IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLlCY-
MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS (1974). "A density bonus allows a 
developer to build the same number of units originally intended on a smaller parcel of 
land, thereby lowering land costs per unit and allowing the developer to realize a larger 
profit." Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning for All: Using Inclusionary Zoning 
Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J. 359, 377 (1995). 
35. See Payne, supra note 17 (manuscript at 3). 
36. See Tondro, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5-8). 
37. See id. (manuscript at 15-16). 
38. A 2000 amendment to the Connecticut statute attempts to counter this ten-
dency of the "zoning only" method to produce housing primarily for "moderate" in-
come families, as opposed to "low income" families. See 2000 Conn. Acts 206 (Reg. 
Sess.). The Connecticut statute now requires, as a prerequisite for using the override 
statute, that not less than 15% of the affordable units go to low-income families -
those with less than 60% of the regional median income. See id. 
As an active participant in and knowledgeable observer of the Connecticut housing 
industry, Professor Tondro expresses considerable skepticism as to the feasibility of 
these requirements. Tondro, supra note 4 (manuscript at 50-65). 
336 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:323 
and finally, the existence or non-existence of a "safe harbor" ex-
empting the community from the override process. The following 
paragraphs highlight the key differences in four different areas. 
A. Type of Builder 
Connecticut and New Jersey impose no restriction on the type 
of builder who can utilize the override process. Massachusetts, on 
the other hand, restricts the builder to a "public agency or any non-
profit or limited dividend organization."39 The Massachusetts re-
striction reflects the requirements of the federal and state subsi-
dized housing programs that were newly created at the time of the 
statute's enactment, requirements that show a certain suspicion of 
(and need to limit) private profit in public programs. Given suffi-
cient flexibility in the interpretation of the phrase "limited dividend 
organization" and skill in drafting and planning, the statutory 
restriction need not be a major barrier to participation in the 
affordable housing process. However, at the practical level, the re-
quirement probably excludes many smaller, single-family home-
builders. Such homebuilders operate as proprietorships or private 
corporations and are likely to produce affordable units with no di-
rect public financial subsidy. It is difficult to justify the exclusion of 
any potential builder of affordable housing. 
The better approach is to regulate conduct, not status. Under 
this approach, all persons and entities who are willing and qualified 
to build and manage suburban affordable housing would be able to 
qualify to take advantage of the override tool, regardless of their 
public non-profit, or private/for-profit status. Problems, if any, with 
excessive private profits in publicly-funded housing programs are 
better addressed in the requirements of the particular housing pro-
grams, not in eligibility for a zoning override. There is a concern 
that private developers may be more likely to manipulate the over-
ride tool, making "blackmailing" statements to towns so that towns 
will approve their subdivision. But excluding an entire category of 
potential builders is an overly-broad way to control the strategic 
misuse of the statutes. 
39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4OB, § 20 (1998). The Rhode Island statute falls in 
between Connecticut and New Jersey on the one hand and Massachusetts on the other. 
Unlike Massachusetts, the Rhode Island statute permits a private developer to utilize 
the override procedure. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4 (1999). However, the housing built 
by the private developer must be "subsidized by the federal or state government under 
any program to assist ... low or moderate income housing," and thus the zoning-only 
approach is not permitted. See id. § 45-53-3(5). 
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B. Participation in a Subsidy Program 
Connecticut and New Jersey correctly focus directly on the af-
ford ability of the units, without regard to whether the builder 
achieves that afford ability through a government program or inter-
nally-generated private subsidy.40 Reflecting their orientation to-
wards the "zoning plus funding" method, the Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island statutes require that affordable housing be con-
structed as part of a government subsidy program.41 Under a literal 
interpretation of these statutes, a builder that produced new afford-
able units as 20% of a new housing development using the "zoning 
only" method would not qualify for the builder's remedy because 
the construction was not part of a government program. No gov-
ernment subsidy, no builder's remedy. 
While intelligent statutory interpretation by the Housing Ap-
peals Committee has softened the edges of the Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island statutory requirement in some respects by recogniz-
ing mortgage interest-rate reduction programs as government subsi-
dies,42 the requirement itself is unwise. If writing a statute anew, 
the better approach for determining initial eligibility for the over-
ride process would be to focus on afford ability itself and not the 
means by which the builder achieves affordability.43 
C. Affordability 
While each jurisdiction makes the override tool and the 
builder's remedy available only for the construction of affordable 
housing, the statutes use different approaches in defining af-
ford ability. The New Jersey statute incorporates the definition used 
by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development: 
low-income housing is housing for households with a gross house-
40. As discussed in the next sub-section, the Connecticut statute actually recog-
nized both subsidized and unsubsidized programs and established different afford ability 
requirements for each program. 
41. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 4OB, § 20; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(5). 
42. Stuborn Ltd. P'ship v. Barnstable Bd. of Appeals, No. 98-01 (Mass. Housing 
App. Committee Mar. 5, 1999), available at http://www.nellco.orglDatabases/Licensed/ 
Social Law LibrarylHousingAppealsCommittee.htm [hereinafter Nellco]. 
43. As noted by Chairperson Lohe in Stuborn, there is a connection between the 
goal of assuring continuing affordability and the means of achieving the affordability 
and the source of the subsidy. See id. If the builder achieves affordability through an 
internal subsidy and imposes no deed restriction on the affordable units, then af-
fordability will likely be lost at the first resale of the property. However, the appropri-
ate response is to address this affordability risk with specific afford ability requirements, 
not with program eligibility requirements. 
338 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:323 
hold income equal to 50% or less of the median gross household 
income (for households of the same size) in the region; moderate-
income housing is housing for households with a gross household 
income equal to more than 50% but less than 80% of the median 
gross household income (for households of the same size) in the 
region.44 Instead of including any income guidelines in their stat-
utes, Massachusetts and Rhode Island instead expressly delegate to 
federal and state government the authority to define the meaning of 
low- and moderate-income housing, stating: "low or moderate in-
come housing" means "any housing subsidized by the federal or 
state government under any program to assist the construction of 
low or moderate income housing as defined in the applicable fed-
eral or state statute. "45 The Connecticut statute combines the two 
approaches and both refers to the standards set by government 
funding sources and provides its own income guidelines. It defines 
an "affordable housing development" as either "assisted hous-
ing"-housing which is receiving, or will receive, financial assis-
tance by any government program, with the affordability 
requirements set by the funding agency46-or a "set-aside develop-
ment" in which not less than 30% of the dwelling units will have 
deed restrictions requiring that the units be sold or rented to fami-
lies whose income is equal to or less than 80% of the area or state 
median income, whichever is less.47 
Recent amendments to the Connecticut statute raise two addi-
tional affordability issues: (1) the required allocation of units be-
tween low-income and moderate-income households; and (2) the 
duration of the afford ability restrictions. Until recently, none of the 
jurisdictions had imposed any statutory limits on the relative alloca-
tion between low-income and moderate-income residents. All af-
fordable units qualified, whether entirely low-income or entirely 
moderate-income. However, as a result of recent amendments, 
Connecticut now requires that not less than 15% of the affordable 
units (which must be not less than 30% of all the units in the devel-
opment) must be offered to low-income individuals (those with less 
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304(c)-(d) (1999). 
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(5). 
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(a)(1)(A)-(3) (1999). 
47. Id. § 8-30(g)(a)(1)(B). While the concept appeared in the original act, the 
term "set-aside development" was added in the 2000 amendments, which also increased 
the required percentage of set-aside units from 25% to 30% and, as noted in the next 
paragraph, added a specific income mix requirement and extended the duration of the 
affordability restrictions from the 30 years added by the 1999 amendments to 40 years. 
2000 Conn. Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.). 
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than 60% of the median income), with the remaining affordable 
units to moderate-income individuals and families.48 As Professor 
Tondro explains, this required targeting will make it very difficult 
for most private developers to build affordable units on a "zoning 
only" basis, without subsidies.49 . 
Connecticut has also recently addressed the duration of the in-
come restrictions on the housing produced under the override pro-
cess.50 The Connecticut statute originally provided that for "non-
assisted housing," the dwelling units must remain affordable "for at 
least thirty years after the initial occupation of the proposed devel-
opment. "51 The 2000 amendments extended that period to 40 
years.52 The other jurisdictions address the duration issue adminis-
tratively and appear to rely on the duration conditions imposed by 
the funding agency. 
D. Definition of Regional Need and Safe Harbor 
A town's share of the regional need for affordable housing de-
termines whether the town is subject to, or exempt from, the over-
ride statute. If a town is below its share of the regional need, it is 
subject to the override statute; if it meets or exceeds the regional 
need, it is exempt. The statutes thus place a large premium on the 
definition of regional need. 
The Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut statutes use 
a crude but administratively simple definition of a town's share of 
the regional need: 10% of its housing stock. If 10% of a town's 
housing stock is "affordable" as that term is defined,53 the town is 
exempt. The statutory regime does not evaluate the local housing 
stock, the availability of sites for additional construction, or the lo-
calor regional demand for new affordable housing. As Professor 
48. [d. 
49. See Tondro, supra note 4 (manuscript at 61-63). 
50. In the world of subsidized housing, this issue is known as "expiring use," and 
has been a major issue for some years. 
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B). 
52. 2000 Conn. Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.). 
53. There are a number of special rules to determine "what counts" as affordable 
housing. Two established counting practices result in over-counting. For example, Mas-
sachusetts has a practice of counting all the units in a mixed-income multi-family apart-
ment complex as affordable, even if only 25% of the units are actually affordable. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (1994). Connecticut has a practice of counting homes 
financed with Connecticut Housing Finance Agency mortgages, even though-since the 
mortgages will be paid off at the time of resale-there is no guarantee of long-term 
affordability. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30(g); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304 
(West 1986). 
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Gouvin demonstrates, a rural town with primarily older, low-cost 
housing, no commuters, and no unmet demand has the same share 
of regional housing need as an exclusive inner suburb, although the 
human and societal need for affordable housing is much greater in 
the inner suburb. 54 New Jersey uses a more elaborate process that 
defines regional need for each town using a variety of market fac-
tors. First developed by the special trial courts established by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II,55 the administrative 
agency created by the subsequent statute has largely adopted (as 
well as domesticated) the detailed methodology.56 
There are recurrent criticisms of both the crude and the more 
refined approach, and it is doubtful that a perfect methodology ex-
ists. As indicated in Section IV, a "growth share" requirement that 
ties a town's affordable housing obligation to its actual growth pro-
vides the most sensible safe harbor (and also best expresses the 
communitarian moral principle that underlies the housing obliga-
tion). However, as between the 10% standard and the more elabo-
rate New Jersey approach, the clarity and simplicity of the 10% 
standard is preferable. 
Two additional distinctive features require comment: the New 
Jersey provision for Regional Contribution Agreements, and the 
Connecticut provision for a moratorium. As a result of a legislative 
compromise, towns in New Jersey can meet up to 50% of their fair 
share obligation, not by producing affordable housing units in their 
town, but by making a payment as part of a Regional Contribution 
Agreement ("RCA") to an approved urban area. Criticized as a 
shameless triumph of money and politics over principle, and chal-
lenged as racially discriminatory, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
refused to declare the RCA section of the statute unconstitu-
tional.57 RCA funds are now said to be the single largest source of 
housing subsidy funding in New Jersey. 58 
The Connecticut statute features a moratorium that permits el-
igible towns to avoid override challenges, even if they have not yet 
met the 10% affordability standard. The protection offered by the 
54. See Gouvin, supra note 24 (manuscript at 21-24). 
55. 456 A.2d at 418-19; see KIRP ET AL., supra note 3, at 103-11 (describing the 
work of the special trial courts and their use of experts to develop the methodology). 
56. See title 5, section 93 of the New Jersey Administrative Code for the fair 
share rules of the Council on Affordable Housing. 
57. In re Township of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257, 1276-77 (N.J. 1993). 
58. See Payne, supra note 17 (manuscript at 6 & n.20). Professor Payne estimates 
that over $120 million has been exchanged and over 6300 units produced with the RCA 
subsidies. /d. 
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moratorium is only partial and short-lived - that is, it does not ap-
ply to developments in which 95% of the occupants have incomes 
less than 60% of the area median or to developments of subsidized 
housing with 40 or fewer units and only lasts 3 years. Moreover, the 
qualifying standards are highly technicaJ.59 Nevertheless, the stat-
ute represents a legislative judgment that towns that have accepted 
affordable housing and that are making good faith efforts to meet 
their obligation are entitled to some temporary relief from the de-
mands of the override statute. 
III. EVALUATING THE STATE OVERRIDE TOOL: LIMITED 
POWER; MORE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES; REASONS FOR 
SELECfING THE LESS EFFECfIVE (As OPPOSED To MORE 
EFFECTIVE) TOOL 
The state override tool has only limited ability to increase the 
supply of suburban affordable housing and to enhance opportuni-
ties for mobility. As mentioned earlier, it creates only a private 
right, not a public (state and local) obligation. The override tool is 
weak in operation because it is indirect, non-directive, and non-fi-
nancial, as opposed to direct, directive, and financial. More effec-
tive tools were and are available but were not and have not been 
chosen.60 After briefly outlining several more effective alternatives, 
this section suggests that the states selected the less effective tool 
because support for the goals was thin and divided-strong enough 
to enact the override statutes, but not sufficiently strong to over-
come opposition to a more effective program. The final section 
identifies a number of measures that states should adopt to achieve 
more fully the goals of the statutes. 
The most effective way for a state to achieve a particular goal 
is to do so directly. If Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
Rhode Island had themselves built suburban affordable housing on 
a regular basis since the time of the enactment of their override 
statutes, they would have, by definition, greatly increased the sup-
ply of such housing. However, our longstanding practice in housing 
assistance relies on local approval and local (mainly private) build-
ing, not direct state construction.61 Moreover, a direct approach 
59. See 2000 Conn. Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.); Tondro, supra note 4 (manuscript at 57-
65). 
60. While these other tools would not be totally effective in achieving the produc-
tion and mobility goals, they would be "more effective" than the override tool by itself. 
61. See generally LAURENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: 
A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION (1968). 
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has been tried only once. The effort by New York State's Urban 
Development Corporation in the late 1960s to build affordable 
housing in suburban Westchester County without local approval 
was swiftly and successfully opposed and has never been tried again 
in New York or elsewhere.62 Even if not able or willing to pursue 
direct construction, a state strongly committed to increasing mobil-
ity could also implement a demand-side program that offers rental 
or home-ownership assistance targeted to those persons or families 
moving from an urban to a suburban area, such as the very success-
ful "Move To Opportunity" ("MTO") program developed as part 
of the consent decree in the Gautreaux litigation.63 
Alternatively, if the direct approach is not possible, a state 
strongly committed to affordable housing could still attempt to 
achieve its goal by being "directive" in two distinct ways: first, to 
62. The initial authorizing legislation gave the Urban Development Corporation 
("UDC") superogatory power. However, when the UDC acquired land by eminent 
domain and attempted to build low-income housing in nine towns in Westchester 
County without seeking local approval, an aroused state legislature quickly stripped the 
UDC of its power and required it to submit all developments for local approval. See 
DANIELSON, supra note 12; CHARLES M. HAAR & DEMETRIUS S. IATRIDIS, HOUSING 
THE POOR IN SUBURBIA 359-61 (1974). 
Although never adopted, the 1968 Kaiser Report recommended that Congress au-
thorize the federal government to purchase land for lease to private developers and to 
preempt local zoning laws. KAISER COMM. REpORT, supra note 25, at 133-34. 
63. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665,668-69 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd sub 
nom. Gautreaux v. Pearce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); see also LEONARD S. RUBI-
NOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE COLOR LINE: FROM PUBLIC Hous-
ING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000); Mary Beers, The Gautreaux Assisted Housing 
Program, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY (G. Thomas Kingsely & 
Margery A. Thrner eds., 1993) (describing the voucher mobility program in detail). 
This housing discrimination lawsuit was filed in 1966 and led to a finding of discrimina-
tion and a remedial order that included class-based metropolitan relief, which the Su-
preme Court later affirmed. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976). The 
litigation is well described in a wonderful book by the lead attorney for the plaintiffs. 
See generally ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE POOR: THE CASE FOR HEROISM 
(1978). 
While there have been MTO-like demonstration programs in several cities, at-
tempts to expand the program have been defeated by Congressional opponents, includ-
ing liberal Democrats. See Philip D. Tegeler et aI., Transforming Section 8: Using 
Federal Housing Subsidies to Promote Individual Housing Choice and Desegregation, 30 
HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451 (1995). Republicans objected to the program as "social 
engineering" and, according to David Rusk, Maryland Senators Barbara Mikulski and 
Paul Sarbanes responded to constituents objecting to the Baltimore demonstration pro-
gram by actively joining the Congressional opposition to the expansion of the MTO 
program. See RUSK, supra note 12, at 273-74. No states have adopted similar programs, 
and the few cities and towns with small programs have adopted them as a result of 
litigation. See Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life 
Opportunities, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335, 339-50 (1993) (describing mobility pro-
grams in a number of cities). 
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the local communities, and second, to their own state governments 
by using financial incentives and disincentives.64 The states could 
issue a directive to all (or certain targeted) communities in the state 
requiring that a certain percentage of all or of newly constructed 
housing units in the town be affordable and providing that failure to 
comply with the directive would result in a loss of state funds for 
other programs.65 State governments regularly impose such direc-
tives and requirements on localities in areas ranging from environ-
mental compliance to education to traffic light placement. An 
affordable housing directive would require each town to adopt and 
implement some form of an "inclusionary" zoning ordinance-a 
technique which, while controversial,66 has been successfully imple-
mented for over 2 decades in Montgomery County, Maryland and 
elsewhere.67 A well-designed "directive" program would provide 
bonus funds to reward communities that complied with the direc-
tive and sanctions for those that did not.68 On a broader level, 
states could issue a directive requiring their own state agencies to 
(1) allocate a certain amount of the limited federal and state hous-
ing funds towards the construction of affordable housing in desig-
nated suburban communities; (2) remove geographical limits on 
portable rental certificates and vouchers; and (3) to institute several 
other well-established counseling, marketing, and record keeping 
programs that have been found to increase regional mobility.69 Fi-
64. To enhance opportunities for inner-city families to occupy the affordable sub-
urban units that have been built, states could also be "directive" and require mobility 
preferences and affirmative marketing for the occupancy of the newly-produced afford-
able units. 
65. A provocatively bold proposal for a federal suburban fair housing initiative 
suggests that Congress amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide for the loss of the 
homeowner's deductions on the federal income tax returns of residents in non-compli-
ant towns. See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair 
Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1606-11 (1993). 
66. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1167, 1215-16 (1981) (criticizing inclusionary zoning ordinances). But see Andrew 
G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Re-
claimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996) (offering a criticism of Professor Ellickson's 
article and a law and economics perspective). 
67. See RUSK, supra note 12. 
68. The importance of bonus funds as incentives has long been noted in the rele-
vant literature. In their 1974 study of Massachusetts affordable housing and zoning, 
Professors Haar and Iatridis reported that the only participating town that voluntarily 
agreed to permit the construction of affordable housing, Stoughton, did so in order to 
receive a large federal water grant which it desperately needed to improve the town 
water supply. HAAR & IATRIDIS, supra note 62. 
69. Tegeler et aI., supra note 63, at 471-74, 481-82 (discussing thoroughly the sec-
ond and third issues). 
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nally, a state could support production and mobility by specifically 
allocating funds to produce the suburban affordable units, to recruit 
and support the mobility occupants for that housing, and to reward 
towns that cooperated in the production of the housing.70 
Instead of pursuing these goals directly through a directive or 
with targeted financial support,71 the states instead chose an indi-
rect, non-directive, and non-financial tool that has been, predict-
ably, limited in its effectiveness. The override tool does not require 
the state to give priority to the production of new suburban afforda-
ble housing or to the use of Section 8 rental certificates to increase 
mobility. By itself, the override tool neither rewards towns for 
good performance nor imposes meaningful sanctions on recalcitrant 
towns or their residents.72 Local governments, which regularly 
work with programs that use both carrots and sticks, accurately as-
sess the absence of incentives and sanctions in the override statutes 
as a sign of weakness. Further, the statutes depend entirely on 
third-parties to construct new housing and do not themselves pro-
vide any financial or other assistance for the construction, market-
ing, or management of such housing, all at a time when federal 
financial support for affordable housing construction has sharply 
declined and state funding has been very limited.73 
Why did all 4 jurisdictions select an inadequate tool instead of 
70. The legislature that enacted the Massachusetts statute clearly envisioned fi-
nancial support from federal housing programs. The 1968 Kerner Commission, 1968 
Douglas Commission, and 1969 Kaiser Commission, all of which recommended zoning 
overrides to promote suburban affordable housing, also recommended major expansion 
of federal financial support for subsidized housing. See ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING 
Up THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 163 (1973) for a proposal to 
provide payments to towns that accepted new affordable housing, including bonus 
school payments and community service funding. 
71. As discussed by Dean Krefetz, Massachusetts has used a directive (in the 
form of Executive Orders) at various times with considerable success, conditioning 
grants on compliance with affordable housing goals. Cf. Krefetz, supra note 14 (manu-
script at 10-12). As demonstrated earlier, at the time of the enactment of the Massa-
chusetts statute, there were a number of new housing programs and a new state housing 
finance agency to provide financial support for affordable housing, albeit without sub-
urban targets. See supra note 28 for this discussion. 
72. The statutes impose a sanction on towns, in the sense that a town that has not 
met its regional need must pay to defend itself in a zoning appeal. Furthermore, be-
cause of the balancing test favoring regional housing needs and the switch in the burden 
of proof, a noncomplying town is more likely to lose such appeals and thus be ordered 
to approve the development. See, e.g., Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 9-10) (dis-
cussing this aspect of the Massachusetts statute). 
73. See Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 33) (discussing the decrease in fed-
eral funding of affordable housing). 
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other, more effective tools? The likely answer is the obvious one:74 
the comparative strength of the support for the goals and the tech-
niques for achieving them versus the strength of the opposition and 
the support for other, competing goals.75 Support for the goals was 
just strong enough to overcome the opposition and to achieve the 
enactment of an override statute. However, the support was too 
weak and not sufficiently united to overcome the opposition to a 
more robust statute and more effective programs. The following 
paragraphs discuss first the limited strength and divided nature of 
the support and then the opposition to the goals and the support for 
the competing goal of local autonomy. 
With respect to the support for the override statutes, the thin-
ness of the initial voting margins and the persistence of efforts to 
repeal and amend have been frequently noted.76 Less discussed has 
been the lack of clarity and agreement among supporters on the 
underlying reasons that animate the goals and the lack of a consen-
sus on why we as a society care (or should care) about the produc-
tion of suburban affordable housing and increased opportunities for 
mobility from city to suburb. No single reason commands a strong 
consensus, and this weakness limits the ability to mobilize more re-
sources to achieve the statutes' goals. 
One must begin by acknowledging two basic facts. First, in the 
United States, there is only limited support for government efforts 
to increase affordable housing production.?7 Most housing is pro-
74. Cf Francis 1. Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That 
the Obvious Is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REv. 69, 71-73 (1993) (observing that "the aspira-
tions embodied in the doctrine of the Rule of Law demand the critical engagement with 
legal practice rather than placid and blind acceptance of that practice"). 
75. Another explanation for why aU 4 states chose a less effective tool lies in the 
evolution of public policy. In the late 1960s, 3 major federal commissions - the Kerner 
Commission, the Douglas Commission, and the Kaiser Commission - strongly pro-
moted zoning overrides combined with federal housing subsidies as the preferred 
method of achieving suburban affordable housing and mobility. Inc1usionary zoning 
ordinances and voucher programs did not appear until the early 1970s. 
There was a stronger zoning approach that was considered and rejected - giving 
to affordable housing developments the type of absolute exemption that, in Massachu-
setts, is authorized by statute for educational, religious, and agricultural uses. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (1994). The Massachusetts legislature rejected the total 
exemption, in this Author's opinion, because it quite correctly trusted developers less 
than churches, educational institutions, and farmers. It was also properly concerned 
that, if an exemption was approved, a huge number of developers would try to take 
advantage of the exemption, putting too much pressure on towns and giving towns too 
little control. 
76. See Krefetz, supra note 14; Roisman, supra note 8; Tondro, supra note 16. 
77. While we have formaUy had a national housing program since the enactment 
of the 1934 Housing Act, and a Cabinet-level housing agency since the creation of the 
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duced by the private market, and our dominant method of provid-
ing affordable housing is a "trickle down" policy, as opposed to a 
new construction policyJ8 Thus, support for affordable housing, 
whatever the location and regardless of occupants, is likely to be 
limited. 
Second, as with all programs espousing related but distinct 
goals (and certainly true with the production and mobility goals of 
the override statutes), different groups of supporters have different 
interests and may favor one goal more than the other. For builders, 
the construction trades, realtors, and supporters of deregulation,79 
the primary interest is in stimulating additional housing construc-
tion, with less concern for either afford ability or mobility and the 
suburban location. For low-income housing advocates, the primary 
focus is afford ability-the more low-income housing, the better-
again with less concern about (city or suburban) location. For 
others, increasing mobility is an essential part of a regional effort to 
help-in different ways and for different reasons-urban families, 
the city, and the suburbs. 
Suburban affordable housing can open the doors to suburban 
education, employment and life for an urban family otherwise 
priced out of that American dream. To the extent that these educa-
tional, employment, and living opportunities are an important part 
of American life, providing access to these opportunities serves the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965, funding has always been lim-
ited. See Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 14). See also supra note 6 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the 1934 Housing Act. Funding for affordable housing 
programs has always been dwarfed by the support for "private" housing provided by 
the interest and property tax deductions allowed homeowners on their federal tax re-
turn. The combined federal subsidy to homeowners exceeded $74.7 billion in 1993, 
while the subsidy for low-income housing assistance was only $18 billion. See Salsich, 
Jr., supra note 27, at 349; see also JARGOWSKY, supra note 19, at 208-09. 
78. "Trickle down" is a "theory that economic benefits to particular groups will 
inevitably be passed on to those less well off." 28 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 515 
(2d ed. 1989). Under this practice, housing produced by private market forces ages, 
becomes less desirable, and then becomes available to lower-income individuals and 
families. This trickle down method of providing affordable housing was also described 
as "filter down." James Wallace, Housing Policies, Production and A!fordability, in 
HOUSING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE URBAN LAND IN. 
STITUTE AND THE CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY 27 (2000), http://www.ulLorgiPublMe-
dia/A_issues/A_HoL3_Sym.pdf (Mar. 29-30, 1999) (on file with the Western New 
England Law Review). 
79. Deregulation advocates view restrictive zoning as an example of inefficient 
government regulation that artificially raises the costs of housing (and other products). 
While they support the zoning override tool, their recommendations are much more 
far-reaching. KEMP COMM'N REpORT, supra note 13. 
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national and moral goal of increasing equality of opportunity.80 To 
the extent it provides suburban housing opportunities for African-
American families, such mobility can be a partial (too little, too 
late) remedy for the unlawful racial discrimination that has been a 
regrettable but persistent part of our history, especially during the 
post-war building of the American suburb. Such opportunities can 
also provide modest steps towards racial integration and the reduc-
tion of racial isolation. In addition to helping families and individu-
als, some supporters also argue that mobility is a necessary and 
important part of a program to strengthen cities by reducing the 
hypersegregation and concentration of very poor individuals and 
families in urban areas.81 Therefore, by strengthening the city and 
the region of which each suburb is a part, mobility will strengthen 
the suburbs as well and better prepare them for intense inter-re-
gional competition.82 Others argue that the increased diversity will 
enrich suburban life and also promote the communitarian moral 
goal of taking care of those in a particular community that need our 
assistance. 
These very different underlying reasons provide the separate 
strands of support for new suburban affordable housing, but do not 
point in a single programmatic direction or command the same 
level of support. For example, a "localist" version of the communi-
tarian moral goal favors taking care of those in the local community 
and supports elderly housing and residence preferences; such a rea-
son might support some new suburban affordable housing, but not 
mobility.83 On the other hand, a demand-side program of housing 
80. See Laurence E. Lynn, JI. & Michael G.H. McGeary, "Conclusions", in IN-
NER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (Laurence E. Lynn, JI. & Michael G.H. 
McGeary eds., 1990); Paul E. Peterson, Introduction: Technology, Race and Urban Pol-
icy, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985). 
81. See MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMU-
NITY AND STABILITY (1997) (arguing that deconcentration works on two levels: at the 
individual level, by providing opportunities for families; and at the community level, by 
reducing the poverty population to a more manageable size so that social programs 
have a greater chance of success); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVAN-
TAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 144 (1987) (reporting 
on the "concentration effects" of very poor families in urban areas). 
82. This argument is made by most of the prominent "regionalists," such as David 
Rusk, Myron Orfield, Anthony Downs, and, to a lesser extent, Paul Jargowsky. See 
JARGOWSKY, supra note 19, at 195. 
83. While in Mount Laurel I, the town opposed affordable housing for African-
Americans who had long lived in town, Mount Laurel /,336 A.2d at 717, the localist 
approach will usually provide housing primarily, and often only, for white persons. Af-
fordable housing advocates use the localist rhetoric extensively, arguing that affluent 
suburbs need to build affordable housing to provide housing for those that work in 
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vouchers (or targeted funds for the purchase of existing homes) will 
enhance opportunity, mobility, and integration but will not directly 
provide any new construction. Construction under the "zoning-
only" method will tend to produce single-family units built in the 
outer suburbs (where raw land is more readily available and land 
prices are lower) and also the smallest allowable number of afforda-
ble units at the highest allowable price. However, such "zoning-
only" uses will create the least opportunity for city-suburb mobility 
and will provide new affordable housing units to only the least 
needy of the possible beneficiaries. 
Support is further limited because the political representatives 
of a major group of potential beneficiaries-African-American ur-
ban families-are not always in agreement with the technique or 
the goals. Concerned about the possible diversion of scarce hous-
ing and community development funds from urban to suburban 
uses, as well as the possible loss of residents (and the decreased aid 
that might follow a shrinking population), many urban leaders give 
at most tepid support (and often quiet opposition) to the mobility 
rationale and instead favor urban redevelopment.84 Others support 
helping city residents find and obtain suburban jobs (through sup-
port for reverse commuting and better information), not suburban 
housing. While there is clearly a strong interest in mobility, it is not 
known what percentage of urban, low-income families (and espe-
cially minority low-income families) would prefer suburban, as op-
posed to urban, affordable housing if they had a choice.85 
town (police officers, fire fighters, secretaries at town hall and in the suburban office 
parks) and for the thirty-somethings who grew up in the town but cannot afford to live 
there with their young families. Professor Roisman quite rightly criticizes this ap-
proach. See generally Roisman, supra note 8. While persuasive in building support at 
the local level, the localist vision does not justify state intervention in local decisions 
and provides no support for mobility. At the policy level, absent improper motives or 
negative externalities, there is no compelling reason for a state to impose Thornton 
Wilder's political philosophy on each of its communities. If they want to adopt it, fine; 
if not, that should be fine too. 
84. At the conference, Henry Thomas, the executive director of the Urban 
League of Greater Springfield, stated that, while he supported both suburban afforda-
ble housing and housing for urban community development and redevelopment, he 
strongly believed that urban initiatives should have a higher priority. Henry Thomas, 
Remarks at Western New England College School of Law Conference on Increasing 
Affordable Housing and Mobility in Three New England States and New Jersey: Com-
parative Perspectives on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Massachu-
setts Comprehensive Permit Law (Dec. 10, 1999) [hereinafter The Housing Confer-
ence]. David Rusk notes that very few urban mayors have spoken out for regional 
approaches, and states that mayors have been "missing in (in)action" on this issue. See 
RUSK, supra note 12, at 312-15. 
85. See John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A 
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Finally, the method and results of implementation may affect 
the level of support. If, as the limited data suggests, the occupants 
of suburban affordable housing turn out to be overwhelmingly 
white and primarily town employees or children of current subur-
ban residents, then support from traditional civil rights organiza-
tions will decline and other supporters may re-evaluate the basis of 
their support.86 
In addition to the relative thinness of the support and diver-
gences among supporters, there is also strong opposition to the 
goals and any type of override technique arguments that have been 
thoroughly analyzed over the years by Anthony Downs, among 
others.87 Local autonomy has incredibly strong support, justified by 
"allocational efficiency in the provision of public services, demo-
cratic citizenship, and self-determination."88 A traditional aspect of 
that autonomy has been the creation of a particular "type" of com-
munity through both zoning and social economic self-selection.89 
There is a racist fear of minority families and a fear of, and objec-
tion to, subsidiZed housing.90 The opposition is so strong that New 
Jersey communities have paid over $120 million in Regional Contri-
bution Agreements to avoid affordable housing in their communi-
ties.91 The strength of such opposition contributes to both the fact 
that there are override statutes in only 4 jurisdictions, and that 
those 4 jurisdictions enacted statutes of only limited effectiveness. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This essay concludes with several recommendations-some in-
formational, some programmatic-for improving our understand-
Back-to-the-Future Essay, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 27, at 
322; Reynold S. Farley et aI., The Residential Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four-
Metropolis Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 763, 767 (1997); Michael R. Tein, The 
Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Subsidized Housing Discrimina-
tion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1463 (1992). 
86. See Roisman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 13, 29). 
87. ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICAN (1994); 
ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS; AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 
(1973). 
88. Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 15 (2000); 
see also id. at 15-16 (discussing the efficiency of local decision-making). 
89. See generally NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES 
OF POWER (1994). 
90. See, e.g., Rolf Pendall, Opposition to Housing: NIMBY and Beyond, 35 URB. 
AFF. REv. 112 (1999) (discussing these fears and objections). 
91. See Payne, supra note 17, at 6 n.17. Professor Payne cites data from the 
COAH website, which reports that some 6300 RCA units have been financed with these 
funds. See id. 
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ing of the statutes and their operation, and for increasing their 
effectiveness. We need more and better data, as well as better and 
more thoughtful analysis of that data. That analysis will show that a 
number of programs and techniques have demonstrated their effec-
tiveness, and that states need to fund and support those programs. 
More fundamentally, however, we need to broaden our sense of 
moral responsibility and legal obligation. An unfunded builder's 
remedy too narrowly conceives the moral responsibility and pro-
vides too limited an instrument to achieve the goals. We must rec-
ognize the moral responsibility of both our states and our towns to 
provide suburban affordable housing and to increase the opportuni-
ties for mobility. We must also impose a practical but enforceable 
legal obligation on both states and communities to meet that 
responsibility. 
The first set of recommendations is for more and better data.92 
The existing information is woefully incomplete and wholly inade-
quate for serious policy analysis and program refinement. As dis-
cussed by Dean Krefetz and Professors Tondro and Payne, the 
available data does establish that a considerable amount of subur-
ban affordable housing has been constructed using the override 
process-18,000 units in Massachusetts;93 approximately 1600 in 
Connecticut;94 and 15,000-20,000 in New Jersey.95 However, the 
available data also establishes for New Jersey, and strongly suggests 
for Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, that the over-
ride tool has been ineffective in creating mobility, and that minority 
individuals and families occupy very few of the units created under 
these programs. However, no state maintains a comprehensive 
database and the limited data that is available is incomplete and 
retrievable only with great effort. 
At a minimum, states need to adopt data collection and reten-
tion programs that provide database files containing: 
1) the number and type of affordable housing units constructed 
as part of the override process, organized by town and by zip 
code, overall and by year (that is, family or elderly, multi-family 
or single-family, under what type of programs [and the income 
92. This Author endorses similar suggestions made by Dean Krefetz and Profes-
sor Roisman. See Krefetz, supra note 14; Roisman, supra note 8; see also Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Pro-
gram and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1011, 1048-49 (1998). 
93. Krefetz, supra note 14 (manuscript at 16). 
94. Tondro, supra note 16 (manuscript at 22). 
95. Payne, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5). 
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range and other requirements of those programs], and by what 
type of developer); 
2) the number and type of affordable housing units that have 
been proposed and rejected, organized by town and by zip code, 
and by housing type and developer; 
3) the number and type of rejected housing proposals that have 
been appealed, and the results of those appeals, organized by 
town and by zip code, and by housing type and developer. 
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With the sole exception of the Wish and Eisdorfer study in 
New Jersey,96 there is no systematic information on the occupants 
of the newly-created affordable housing. A major research project 
needs to be conducted in each jurisdiction and then systematically 
maintained to gather information on the occupants, including prior 
residence, income, education, employment information, and race. 
Once the appropriate data is compiled and maintained, there is 
then a critical need for careful studies that integrate the new data 
with other databases and make the type of comparisons and assess-
ments customary in modern policy analysis but lacking thus far in 
this area. For example, to understand the trends of suburban af-
fordable housing development and their connection to the general 
real estate production cycles, researchers need to compare, by state, 
town and zip code, the number of units of affordable housing built 
under the override process with the total number of housing units 
built during the same period. To assess the nature and extent of 
economic and racial integration, it is necessary to analyze the socio-
economic status of the residents of the zip codes where different 
types of units have been built and where new occupants have cho-
sen to reside. It would also be useful to evaluate the same data on 
the zip codes where affordable units have been proposed but 
rejected. 
More broadly, careful policy analysis requires the comparison 
of the override results with one or more control groups. In this 
regard, it would be useful to compare the number, location and oc-
cupancy characteristics of suburban affordable housing in the over-
ride states with similar data from other comparable states (such as 
New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Illinois) that lack a compa-
rable suburban affordable housing statute, thereby testing the hy-
pothesis that the override states will show more production. 
Similar comparisons should be made with suburban affordable 
housing built in the state (California) and counties (such as Mont-
96. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 18. 
352 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:323 
gomery County, Maryland) that have used a different type of sub-
urban affordable housing statute, the inclusionary zoning statute, 
and with the mobility achieved in the "Movement To Opportunity" 
programs such as the Gautreaux97 program in metropolitan 
Chicago. 
There is also a need for continued discussions of the tensions 
between and within the production and mobility goals,98 which 
hopefully will lead to greater clarity and more refined understand-
ings that will be translated into program and funding criteria. As an 
example, if mobility is recognized as a priority, a state will then con-
sider which locations (inner versus middle versus outer suburb) are 
most likely to advance that priority and will establish incentives and 
disincentives accordingly, using pro-mobility factors as criteria in 
application-ranking and funding decisions. The state will similarly 
evaluate the housing type (rental or single family) and income level 
(very low or moderate) that will best facilitate the mobility goal. It 
will also require mobility preferences (and forbid or sharply limit 
residence preferences) and will assist with affirmative marketing 
and a variety of mobility support programs.99 
Whatever the degree of commitment to suburban affordable 
housing and mobility, there will also be a host of difficult decisions 
in program design and implementation. Given the reality of limited 
(and scarce) funds for new affordable housing production, any deci-
sion on the percentage allocated to new suburban affordable hous-
ing and mobility, as opposed to urban redevelopment or rural 
housing, will surely cause difficult political arguments that many 
would prefer to avoid. Decisions on which income level to target as 
likely program beneficiaries-very low-, low- or moderate-income 
families-will determine which urban families will be eligible for 
this opportunity and which will not. Decisions on the type of hous-
ing produced present similar conundrums. On the one hand, home-
97. See supra note 63 for a discussion of the Gautreaux cases. 
98. There have of course been many insightful academic discussions regarding the 
statutory goals, notably the North Carolina and Pennsylvania symposia, which are cited 
in the bibliography. See Koneski-White, supra note 3. There needs to be a continued 
focus on goals, programmatic implications, and tradeoffs. While there is, of course, the 
risk that these discussions will be ignored, or rejected by policy-makers, the greater risk 
is that the issues themselves will be ignored, or presented and understood in an overly 
simplistic way that will not produce lasting support. 
99. If the state decided that it was unable or unwilling to adopt these mobility-
enhancing criteria in the production programs that it oversees or funds, it might decide 
instead to channel resources into, and to achieve the mobility goal through, a demand-
side voucher program. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the voucher program. 
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ownership programs offer a "piece of the rock" and the realization 
of an important part of the American dream. On the other hand, 
the families most eligible for and interested in suburban homeown-
ership are likely to be at the upper and relatively "whiter" tier of 
the target population and, thus, comparatively less in need of this 
assistance. Furthermore, the restrictions that preserve the long-
term afford ability of the units will prevent new owners of single-
family affordable housing from building the equity in their homes 
that is such a significant part of middle-class wealth (and a major 
source of the wealth gap between races).lOO These are not easy dis-
cussions to have, nor easy decisions to make. However, not having 
these discussions and not making the decisions openly means that 
the decisions will be made in an inadvertent or ad hoc manner, as 
the consequence of a decision that pays attention to some other, 
less controversial variable. 
There is no shortage of programs deserving of recommenda-
tion and implementation. The list provided by the Kerner Commis-
sion in 1968 is a good place to start: 6 million new affordable units 
over the course of 5 years, built mainly in the suburbs, with stronger 
enforcement of fair housing laws. lOi Professor Roisman updated 
and expanded that list in her 1998 review of American Apartheid102 
and in this symposium by including MTO-like mobility programs; 
explicit, race-based affirmative marketing; and Montgomery 
County-like inclusionary zoning ordinances. Both lists identify pro-
grams and strategies with proven track records in meeting both pro-
duction and mobility goals. While they all make use of a zoning 
provision, they also require funding, an active and race-conscious 
mobility effort, and the recognition and enforcement of a govern-
ment (as well as a private) obligation. 
The experiences in the 4 override states demonstrate that it is 
not possible to achieve the production and mobility goals without 
government funding. The "zoning only" private market approach is 
too limited both in the number of units that it can realistically pro-
duce (even in a strong real estate market) and in its ability to reach 
100. See generally DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, 
WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA (1999); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHlWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INE-
QUALITY (1995). 
101. See KERNER COMM'N REpORT, supra note 10, at 260. The Kerner Report 
was issued prior to the 1968 passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act. 
102. Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Neces-
sity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1995) 
(reviewing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19). 
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the lower-income levels of the eligible population. In addition to 
development funding, there is also a need to provide funds to the 
receiving communities, both as an incentive and reward for cooper-
ation and as compensation for increased costs.103 
Finally, we need to recognize the moral responsibility of both 
the state and its towns to provide suburban affordable housing, to 
increase opportunities for mobility, and to impose a series of practi-
cal but enforceable legal obligations on both states and communi-
ties to meet that responsibility. The best technique for recognizing 
this moral responsibility and legal obligation is the "growth share" 
requirement that has been developed and proposed by John 
Payne.104 The requirement is simple and straightforward. IDS Every 
town is required to assure the provision of affordable housing in its 
town, with the actual amount of affordable housing set as a percent-
age (5% or 10%) of the amount of new growth in that town. Each 
town decides for itself how best to meet the requirement-whether 
to require subdivision developers to provide that percentage of 
their units, to build the affordable housing itself, or to work in part-
nership with private developers. The requirement best expresses 
the communitarian moral principle that most strongly supports the 
suburban affordable housing movement and best accommodates 
that principle to the competing interest in local autonomy. It begins 
the necessary process of converting the override tool from the pri-
vate rights of a builder into the public obligation owed by state and 
local government. If combined with incentives and disincentives in-
corporated into state funding policies and practices, it will go a long 
way towards strengthening the commitment to the production and 
mobility goals and hastening the day when those goals can be 
achieved. 
103. Whatever one's views on increased education and other costs, it is clear 
that-unless some state or regional agency is assigned the tasks-towns will need to 
oversee the affordable housing programs in their communities and that there will be 
expenses in doing so. In his address at the conference, Michael laillett, the town man-
ager of Westwood, an outer suburb southwest of Boston, Massachusetts, estimated that 
one staff person spent one-half of her time in overseeing and administering the town's 
affordable housing program. Michael laillet, Luncheon Address at The Housing Con-
ference, supra note 84. 
104. See Payne, supra note 17 (manuscript at 23 n.38 and accompanying text). 
105. That is, the requirement is simple and straightforward as compared to the 
alternatives, of course. As Professor Payne points out, even the growth share concept 
has details that need to be developed. However, the basic framework should make 
their elaboration more comprehensible and therefore manageable. See id. 
